Once the BRICS summit is over, it is possible to reflect on the summit’s decisions and their implications for the future. I have followed the evolution of BRICS engagement since its inception in 2009, and one of the challenges of BRICS summits is that the declarations are often lengthy, making it time-consuming to filter through the most significant points. After a few days of digestion Kazan DeclarationI think I can think better about the implications of the statement.

Unlike 2023, where group expansion dominated the agenda, the 2024 Summit showed more incremental progress in existing processes. For me, the two highlights of this year are a continuation of what was decided last year.

Cross-border payment systems and banking coordination

The first notable point is the progress made on 2023 Johannesburg II Declarations regarding payment systems and the use of local currencies. In 2023, BRICS agreed to task finance ministers and central bank governors with identifying options for heads of state to better trade with local currencies. Rather than making new announcements, at this summit the BRICS presented progress in areas such as cross-border payment system and the Interbank coordination mechanism while announcing upcoming discussions on cross-border settlement and reinsurance. These efforts align with The objective of the new development bank to increase its local currency loans to 30% of its loan portfolio by 2026.

These measures indicate that BRICS is not actively pursuing dedollarization. Instead, they create opportunities to make intra-BRICS trade more attractive by providing diversification options and reducing exposure to risks inherent in the current international financial architecture.

Who participates?

The second notable point for me was the creation of a new level of participation: partner countries. Until this year, the only way for non-BRICS members to engage at the Summit was through the BRICS+ awareness initiative. BRICS+ is an outreach mechanism involving non-BRICS members at the end of formal procedures. This is similar to how the G7 invites non-member countries to its summits without integrating them into G7-led initiatives. These engagements are generally very one-off and offer limited benefits to those who participate.

The new category of partner countries will include additional countries without full membership. The new category allows partner countries to engage more regularly with BRICS and benefit from BRICS initiatives. This level of membership reflects a compromise within BRICS, given persistent internal divisions among full members over the pace and utility of new expansions. The partner country approach appealed to countries like Brazil and new members (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates), who felt that further expansion would be premature and could dilute the gains from new members of the alliance. ‘last year. This has also pleased countries like Russia and China, which are seeking more assertive expansion. South Africa and India appeared ambivalent and would have adapted to any broader consensus within the group.

Expansion and financial cooperation

The difference between the BRICS+ and partner countries is directly linked, at least in principle, to the BRICS seeking to institutionalize tools that allow their members to trade more effectively with each other. Although the reform of international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank remains at the heart of BRICS concerns, these mechanisms – payment systems and interbank cooperation – are now among the main drivers of discussions within the group. These mechanisms, which are becoming an increasingly regular part of the BRICS annual calendar, offer partner countries the opportunity to benefit directly from their outcomes, even if their status means they have limited say in negotiations and implementation.

For example, think about FAST. When it was founded in 1973, it only served financial institutions in 15 countries in Europe and North America. Despite certain exceptions such as Russia, SWIFT is now almost universal. However, it remains a Western-led institution, even though it has long been seen as a global commons. Most of the world today enjoys mostly transparent international transactions.

However, many non-Western countries are wary of the universality of SWIFT, even before Russia invades Ukraine in 2022. Lacking influence in decision-making, countries worry about its potential use as a political tool.

The risk of being entirely dependent on SWIFT and foreign exchange pressure are pushing many non-Western countries to look for an alternative. For many countries, this is a compelling reason to seek membership or partnership with BRICS. It is not a question of disengaging from the West: they will continue these commitments. Instead, they are looking for complementary tools that enable real-time, low-cost transactions in local currencies when trading with other countries – a logical motivation for engaging in a partnership with BRICS.

BRICS will not fundamentally change the world order, but the international order is evolving rapidly, independent of any informal groups.

Discussions on the use of local currencies within BRICS are directly related. For some countries, such as Russia and Iran, these initiatives allow them to engage more directly in international trade, as they have limited or no access to existing systems due to sanctions imposed on their economies. For others, such as Brazil, India, China, South Africa and new members, it allows them to align with existing pilot projects or infrastructure being developed in their respective countries . Although acronyms like Pix, UPI, CIPS, PayShap and MiR may not mean much to outsiders, for BRICS countries these national experiences with instant payment systems will play a central role in the implementation of decisions that advance intra-BRICS economic integration.

Change in the world order?

BRICS are often presented as contributing to a world order change. However, I do not see BRICS as a threat to the world order. Instead, initiatives like these could help create a more level playing field, where diversity in trade, currencies and interbank integration provide new levels of competitiveness. At the national level, we know that the design, implementation and adoption of digital tools for financial inclusion will not happen overnight. However, these mechanisms can fundamentally change financial interactions within BRICS and will play a key role in the development of inter-BRICS mechanisms.

For African countries, these discussions present significant opportunities. With three full members (Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa) and potentially three partner countries (Algeria, Nigeria and Uganda), there is strong momentum for solid implementation of the Convention. Pan-African payment and settlement system (PAPPS). Some of Africa’s largest economies now have the opportunity to ensure that PAPPS complements other systems, such as SWIFT and the upcoming BRICS cross-border payments system. By making transactions inside and outside Africa cheaper, faster and interoperable, the continent could gain the competitive advantage it seeks.

A number of people have commented to me that they found the final declaration of this summit “boring”, and honestly, I’m happy about that. This summit may not have been the most crucial in BRICS history – I still see 2023 as a more important turning point – but it was a critical moment to show progress and direction. It also demonstrated to outsiders that BRICS is not a threat to the world order but a pragmatic group with tempered decisions that allow its members to engage, get acquainted and find common denominators.

Strategic patience is an art in international relations. BRICS and non-BRICS members exhibit a lot of hyperbole when describing each other. Perhaps the key lesson is to take these statements with a grain of salt. BRICS will not fundamentally change the world order, but the international order is evolving rapidly, independent of any informal groups. Nonetheless, BRICS is not unimportant and member countries will continue to push for more democratized global decision-making structures and their own role in them.

Gustavo de Carvalho is an international relations analyst and advisor focused on multilateralism, African governance, diplomacy and international organizations. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Africa Governance and Diplomacy Program.

This blog post was developed based on thoughts originally shared on X. You can find the original thread here.