There are widespread reports of arrests of Al-Shabaab insurgents, the dismantling of an Al-Shabaab terrorist network, and weapons interceptions in Ethiopia in 2024. Reports also suggest that Al-Shabaab seeks to establish “an active combat presence” in Ethiopia. the Bale Mountains.

The reports have sparked growing fears that the terrorist group could seek to establish a presence in Ethiopia, as it has done in Kenya.

The Somali jihadist group is active in Kenya. It targets civilians, security agents and telecommunications infrastructure. The kidnapping of a French woman in 2011 contributed to Kenya’s invasion of Somalia. Ensuing hostilities led to terrorist killings at a Nairobi shopping mall in 2013 and at a public university in 2015.

Ethiopian fears are fueled by examples of terrorist groups making incursions when governments are weak. It is precisely for this reason that my own research has documented the rise of African jihadist organizations such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam waal-Muslimeen (JNIM) in Mali and Burkina Faso and Mashebabo in Mozambique.

But as a researcher and author who has studied Islamism in the Horn of Africa and the al-Shabaab group, I have a different perspective on Ethiopia’s vulnerability.

It is true that the Ethiopian government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is weaker than it has ever been. This is mainly due to armed conflicts within its borders. These include the now ended conflict in Tigray. The conflict has created tensions among Tigrayan leaders.

There is active conflict in Amhara and Oromia in addition to numerous pastoral conflicts.

It is also true that the previously highly professional Ethiopian army is weaker than before. This follows the purge of Tigrayan officers and men before and during the Tigray War. A number of senior intelligence and counterintelligence officers were also purged.

However, these developments should not lead to the conclusion that Al-Shabaab is poised to make major gains in Ethiopia. My view is that recent developments could enable small-scale terrorist operations in the Somali Regional State which borders Somalia. This could extend to the Oromia region and the capital Addis Ababa. However, the possibilities for a greater presence are limited.

Two main factors put al-Shabaab at a disadvantage. The first concerns clan animosities between al-Shabaab and part of the Somali population in Ethiopia. These conflicts stem from previous conflicts around the port of Kismayo, more than 15 years ago, which alienated the Shabaab from a large part of the Ogadeen clan, the clan which constitutes the majority of the inhabitants of the Somali National State in Ethiopia. The second is the terrorist group’s poorly developed propaganda strategy. He failed to win Ethiopian support.

Al-Shabaab propaganda in Kenya and Tanzania has focused on specific minorities. But in Ethiopia, its messages present the entire Ethiopian population as the enemy of Al-Shabaab.

The militant group Harakat al-Shabaab, as it calls itself, originated 18 years ago in the Somali regional state of Ethiopia. With a strength recently estimated between 7,000 and 12,000 soldiers, it has carried out deadly attacks in Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda. But so far it has failed to launch terrorist attacks in Ethiopia.

Al-Shabaab’s involvement in Ethiopia is not new. The first unsuccessful attempt to establish itself in Ethiopia was in the Somali state, populated mainly by ethnic Somalis. The newly formed jihadist group attempted to establish a permanent presence there.

However, relations between al-Shabaab and the Ogadeen clan – which represents 40-50% of the state’s population – deteriorated rapidly between 2008 and 2010 over profitable control of the southern port of Kismayo. Somalia. The Ogadeens are present in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. These animosities persist to this day.

The Somali regional state provides a natural springboard for Al-Shabaab’s infiltration attempts into Ethiopia, mainly due to its ethnic affinities with Somalia. However, hostile relations between the Ogadeen and al-Shabaab limit this potential.

Al-Shabaab has been more successful in recruiting Ethiopian Oromos, the country’s largest ethnic group. The Oromos have a long history of anti-government insurgency. But Oromo fighters within al-Shabaab have never benefited from the status or media reputation that, for example, Kenyan foreign fighters had with their leader Imam Ali. Additionally, there are reports of mistreatment among Al-Shabaab Oromo foreign fighters.

All of this combines to undermine al-Shabaab’s ambitions in Ethiopia.

Propaganda is an important tool for Harakat Al Shabaab. In other countries, the group often works to create distrust between part of the local population and its government. It plays on the grievances of the marginalized and on religious animosities.

Al-Shabaab propaganda aimed at Ethiopia tends to focus on the historical rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia, dating back to the 15th century. The propaganda presents Ethiopia as the eternal enemy of Christians.

This has the effect of portraying Ethiopia (and its population groups) as a single entity working against Somali interests. Propaganda often serves Somali nationalist narratives dressed up in Islamist rhetoric. It tends to confuse “Somali interests” with “Muslim interests”, neglecting other “Muslim interests” in the Horn of Africa. For example, the majority of Oromo people in Ethiopia are also Muslims.

Propaganda efforts targeting potential non-Somali recruits in Ethiopia, such as the Afars and Oromos, are poorly developed.

Ethiopia may be weaker politically and militarily, but it is still not an easy target for al-Shabaab. This is partly due to al-Shabaab’s lack of strategies to take advantage of Ethiopia’s current problems.

Stig Jarle Hansen is Professor of International Relations at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences