While Syrian opposition forces, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), establish As a transitional government, the implications of Bashar al-Assad’s fall extend far beyond Syria. Russian President Vladimir Putin has made a series of strategic miscalculations there that will weaken Russia’s influence, not only in the Middle East but throughout Africa.

Putin’s first miscalculation was to eliminate Yevgeny Prigozhin, the former paramilitary leader. Wagner Group and the architect behind the security infrastructure that allowed Russian mercenaries to operate efficiently in Syria. Even though he had little choice but to shake off the failure coup conspiratorPutin lost not only a valuable tool for military operations, but also a critical intelligence-gathering asset. Prigozhin was the brains behind the Kremlin disinformation campaigns in the Middle East and the Sahel, which have played a crucial role in shaping Russia’s influence in these regions. He also designed financial schemes to help Russia escape sanctions. In April 2022, it was reported that Prigozhin orchestrated two loans to the Assad regime totaling $1 billion for supplies, benefiting oligarchs sanctioned by the US and EU.

Since 2023, Putin tried to save Russia has succeeded in gaining a foothold in Syria, but its efforts have clearly failed. The ecosystem that Prigozhin built and maintained in Syria has proven difficult to replicate. He has been reported that the profitability of oil and gas holdings collapsed once the Russian Defense Ministry took over Wagner’s operations. Furthermore, they did not anticipate the repercussions of Israeli operations against Iranian targets. Given Russia’s dependence on Iran to maintain its activities in Syria after more than a decade of collaboration and coordination to support the Assad regime, this surveillance has considerably weakened Moscow’s strategic position in the region.

Putin’s second strategic mistake was to make Syria the centerpiece of Russia’s regional logistics operations. While this reliance may have been born out of necessity, it exposed critical vulnerabilities. Russia relies heavily on Syrian military bases to facilitate its arms trafficking, gold smugglingand the illicit transactions of his mercenaries. In particular, a CNN investigation revealed that a military plane carried out at least sixteen gold smuggling flights from Sudan to Latakia – a Syrian port city housing a Russian military base – serving as a financial lifeline for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Under the regime of Bashar al-Assad, Syria has transformed into a veritable narco-state, flooding the Middle East with Captagon—a highly addictive drug responsible for countless deaths. By anchoring its regional strategy on a deeply compromised state, Russia has aligned itself with a regime characterized by corruption, inefficiency, and a perilous reliance on illicit economies. The Gulf countries, at the heart of Moscow’s policy diplomatic approach in a context of escalating Western sanctions, we have achieved normalization with Assad depending on his efforts to dismantle Syria’s role in drug trafficking, a condition his regime has failed to fulfill. This gap not only reveals Damascus’ resistance to reforms, but also highlights the risky nature of Russia’s partnership with a fragile and Failed state.

Third, the most stunning and critical strategic mistake Putin has made, especially after the invasion of Ukraine, is to underestimate Turkey’s posture and its ability to respond decisively to threats to its national security interests. Ankara has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to organize, mobilize and counteract actors who challenge its strategic priorities, both within the region and beyond.

By underestimating Ankara’s influence solve by forcing Assad to reach an agreement This involves managing the Syrian opposition and welcoming refugees, but Russia has miscalculated the balance of power in Syria and the wider region. It was actually only a matter of time before Turkey confronted the Assad regime. As Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said declared December 2: “At this point, the reason for the resumption of widespread clashes in Syria is that interrelated problems have not been resolved for more than 13 years. » This oversight not only complicated Russia’s operations, but also allowed Turkey to assert itself as a dominant regional player, further eroding Moscow’s influence.

While it is impossible to know Putin’s exact thoughts, he probably miscalculated in viewing Syria as a frozen conflict. He believed that time would improve the situation, that the United States would gradually accept some normalization with Assad, and that this would tip the scales in its favor. He was wrong.

Finally, a glaring flaw in Putin’s strategy is his failure to address the risks that accompany his strategic gains. While he has skillfully capitalized on opportunities, such as securing a presence in Syria, expanding Russia’s air defense network through a anti-access zone/area denial (A2/AD) in the Eastern Mediterranean and gaining a strategic position to put pressure on NATO’s southern flank, it neglected to mitigate the inherent vulnerabilities associated with these achievements.

Among these risks, the most important is Russia’s excessive dependence on Iran. Even if Tehran serves as a pragmatic partner to counter American influence, the United States Alliesand put pressure on States not normalizing relationships with Israel, it’s an inherent problem low diet. Indeed, Israel has demonstrated exceptional resolve, capability, and consistency in targeting Iran’s proxies, particularly Hezbollah. Russia has depended heavily on Iran’s proxies, like Hezbollah, continue his operations. By systematically attacking these proxies, Israel has indirectly exposed the fragility of Putin’s dependence on Tehran.

The consequences of these calculation errors are undeniable. Russia’s years-long efforts to position itself as an alternative guarantor of security collapsed in just a few days. Viral videos showing anti-Assad rebels capture quickly towns, villages and military bases have shattered Moscow’s carefully cultivated image. Putin can no longer tout his role in “rescuing” Assad from the Syrian civil war – a narrative he has often used strengthen Russia’s influence abroad. Once a key asset in Russia’s efforts to court military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, Russia’s image as a protector of global authoritarians has lost much of its credibility.

Considering the significant investments Russia has invaded Syria and Putin finds himself at a crossroads. Unless he seeks a compromise with Syrian rebels and the opposition to secure Russia’s presence, the strategic ambition of pressuring NATO on both its eastern and southern flanks risks slipping between him. fingers.

More importantly, Syria is not the only country in which Turkey has direct national interests and in which Russia and Iran have interfered. Libya, where Russia has established several military bases supporting Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in the country’s civil war could also escape Putin. As the legitimate Libyan government starts to feel If Russia is increasingly unable to support its mercenaries or effectively support its factions, Moscow’s influence in Libya could quickly diminish.

Israel’s decisive strikes against Iran’s proxies triggered a domino effect, which Turkey skillfully exploited to destabilize the Russian-Iranian alliance in Syria, further threatening Russia’s regional foothold.

As Ukraine continues to resist Putin’s assaultThe United States finds itself at a decisive turning point. This moment offers a unique opportunity to strengthen American deterrence, not only in the Middle East but also throughout the Middle East. the Sahelwhere regional stability is increasingly at stake.

Forging strategic cooperation with Turkey in Syria and Libya could prove transformative. Such a partnership would bring mutual benefits by further weakening the Iran-Russia security axis and realigning the regional balance of power. Moreover, it would allow the United States and its allies to play a decisive role in shaping the future of a democratic post-Assad Syria.

Furthermore, it would allow the United States to regain a strong position in North Africa and the Sahel, countering the influence that Russia has invested significant time and resources to cultivate. By acting decisively, the United States can regain leadership in these critical regions and safeguard its long-term strategic interests. It’s now or never.

Read in The national interest.

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