Revisiting the debate over stationing U.S. troops in Taiwan or the Philippines during World War II helps us understand China’s possible invasion strategies today.

• By Michael Turton / Contributing journalist

Several recent articles have explored historical invasions of Taiwan, both actual and planned, to examine the problems the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would face in the event of an invasion. Military and geographical obstacles remain formidable.

Taiwan, however, is part of a broader set of problems created by the PRC’s broad expansion front. This package also includes Japan’s Okinawa Islands and the Senkaku Islands, known in Taiwan as the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), to the north, as well as the South China Sea and some northern Philippine islands to the south.

THE DEBATE

GRAPHIC: TT

Previous invasions of Taiwan make good objects of study and reflection, but a related but independent historical event also worth exploring for its ability to shed light on a potential invasion is the debate among U.S. policymakers during World War II over the question of whether Formosa or the Philippines should be the priority objective of the American advance in the Western Pacific, in the so-called “Luzon versus Formosa” debate.

By May 1943, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had developed a strategic plan for waging war against Japan. According to The Approach to the Philippines: The War in the Pacific, Robert Ross Smith’s excellent book on the invasion of the Philippines, “its underlying concepts governed the planning and execution of operations in the Pacific for a year and a half of debate.

The plan was based on the understanding that an invasion of Japan would likely be necessary and that such an invasion would require aerial bombardment in preparation for the invasion.

Photo: Reuters

This led, by a logical process, to the need to secure a port and air bases somewhere in the “strategic triangle” formed by Luzon (the largest island in the Philippines), Formosa and southern China. This in turn meant securing bases south of this area to support the capture of Formosa or Luzon.

As the debates continued, it became clear to the Joint Chiefs that Formosa was by far the best target. The main proponent for prioritizing Formosa came from Admiral Ernest J King, Chief of Naval Operations and a member of the Navy’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. Craig Symonds writes in World War II at Sea that “King believed that the capture of Formosa would cut Japan off entirely from its essential imports and starve it until it surrendered, making an invasion of the home islands unnecessary. »

King also believed that American bases in Taiwan would stifle Japanese bases to the south. In fact, by the summer of 1945, starvation was widespread among Japanese troops stationed on the Pacific Islands, cut off from their home islands by a submarine blockade.

Photo: AFP

The PRC must see the same thing today, regarding Taiwan’s position. Is the “fundamental interest” they so often speak of Taiwan’s, or is it a war against Japan? Or is it the strategic influence of the Pacific islands to the south that the PRC would gain by holding Taiwan? After all, Japan is the Pacific Islands’ second-largest trading partner after the PRC, according to its Foreign Ministry.

In contrast, General Douglas MacArthur famously defended the Philippines, arguing that the United States had a moral obligation to save it from Japanese rule and that, more practically, bases in Luzon would be necessary to support an American invasion of Formosa .

FOOD BLOCKADE

A third, minority position called for bypassing both in favor of a direct invasion of Japan (or Okinawa). MacArthur argued convincingly that bypassing part of the Philippines while leaving it under Japanese rule would amount, in essence, to a food blockade of parts of the Philippines that were not in Allied hands.

The food issue receives a lot of attention today because it concerns both Taiwan and the PRC, but the debate on Taiwan rarely takes Japan into account. The top source of food imports from Japan is the PRC, while five of the remaining top ten importers are in Asia. War would devastate Japan’s food security. Likewise, while one might think that the Philippines, with its abundant agriculture, would do well, it is in fact a net importer of agricultural products. Indeed, over the past three years, it has become the world’s largest importer of rice.

This means that in the event of war, even if Taiwan maintained a lifeline to Luzon to transport food and ammunition, that food would have to come from outside the Philippines. Sourcing food locally would drive up prices (which will skyrocket in the event of war anyway), starving the poor. Can Philippine land communications and logistics meet the dual demands of food and munitions for Taiwan and local needs?

Smith describes in his book how American planners ultimately abandoned Formosa because it would have been much easier for Japan to bring in planes to contest the invasion and bring them across the narrow strait from China, which it occupied . Invading Formosa would also require the United States to engage in campaigns against Japanese bases at Amoy (Fujian) in China, with secondary invasions that would require not only unacceptable levels of combat troops, but even greater numbers significant number of service troops, which the United States did not have. This would consume so many landing craft that it would have to be delayed until November 1945, pushing back other much-needed campaigns (landing craft availability was a key determinant of American strategy in all theaters).

Finally, MacArthur stated that the Navy’s fast carrier groups would be tied up in the Formosa theater for an extended period during the capture of the island, while the carriers would only be needed for the initial move to the Philippines. Once the Luzon bases are acquired, they could be freed for operations elsewhere.

In contrast, the Philippines would offer MacArthur tens of thousands of loyal Filipino troops to support the American war effort, something that did not exist in Formosa. Gradually, the momentum moved towards Luzon. By late 1944, according to Smith, King was almost alone in thinking that Formosa-Amoy would be better.

PRC CAPABILITIES

Much ink has been spilled about the PRC’s capabilities and that country’s enormous navy. Does the PRC have the competent rear support units that would be needed in abundance for simultaneous campaigns against Taiwan and its supporting islands? Indeed, as Smith writes, American planners ultimately opted for the Philippines, not because Luzon was the better strategic choice, but because the United States did not have the resources for the Formosa-Amoy campaign. . The United States, alas, was woefully lacking in most of what it would need to sustain such a war.

The choices and combinations of Luzon versus Formosa versus Okinawa versus Japan, the first island chain, are reflected in PRC military planning today. Surely there must be PRC planners who argue that it will have to take Luzon or an island in the strait between Luzon and Taiwan to secure the southern flank. As I have repeatedly pointed out in this article, Beijing’s public interest in Northern Luzon goes back many years. Therefore, the PRC’s gray zone operations against the Philippines in the South China Sea should be seen as an exercise and a test of Manila for such operations.

Notes from Central Taiwan is a column written by longtime resident Michael Turton, who provides incisive commentary informed by three decades of living and writing about his adopted country. The opinions expressed here are his own.